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Abstract
In the United States wealth is highly concentrated and very un-
equally distributed: the richest 1% hold one third of the total wealth in
the economy. Understanding the determinants of wealth inequality is
a challenge for many economic models. We summarize some key facts
about the wealth distribution and what economic models have been able
to explain so far.
¤We gratefully acknowledge ¯nancial support from NSF grants (respectively) SES-
0318014 and SES-0317872. We are grateful to Marco Bassetto, Wojciech Kopczuk and
an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the au-
thors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Federal Reserve
System, or the NSF.1 Introduction
In the United States wealth is highly concentrated and very unequally dis-
tributed: the richest 1% of the households own one third of the total wealth in
the economy. Understanding the determinants of wealth inequality is a chal-
lenge for many economic models. In this paper, we summarize what is known
about the wealth distribution and what economic models have been able to
explain so far.
The development of various data sets in the past 30 years (in particular
the Survey of Consumer Finances) has allowed economists to quantify more
precisely the degree of wealth concentration in the United States. The picture
that emerged from the di®erent waves of these surveys con¯rmed the fact that
a large fraction of the total wealth in the economy is concentrated in the hand
of the richest percentiles: the top 1% hold one third, and the richest 5% hold
more than half of total wealth. At the other extreme, a signi¯cant fraction of
the population holds little or no wealth at all.
Income is also unequally distributed, and a large body of work has studied
earnings and wage inequality. Income inequality leads to wealth inequality as
well, but income is much less concentrated than wealth, and economic mod-
els have had di±culties in quantitatively generating the observed degree of
wealth concentration from the observed income inequality. The question is
what mechanisms are necessary to generate saving behavior that leads to a
distribution of asset holdings consistent with the actual data.
In this work, we describe the main framework for studying wealth in-
equality, that of general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents, in
which some elements of a life-cycle structure and of intergenerational links are
present. Some models consider a dynasty as a single, in¯nitely-lived agent,
1while others consider more explicitly the life-cycle aspect of the saving deci-
sion. Baseline versions of these models are unable to replicate the observed
wealth concentration. More recently, however, some works have shown that
certain ingredients are necessary, and sometimes enable the model to replicate
the data. Bequests are a key determinants of inequality, and careful mod-
elling of bequests is vital to understand wealth concentration. In addition,
entrepreneurs constitute a large fraction of the very rich, and models that ex-
plicitly consider the entrepreneurial saving decision succeed in dramatically
increasing wealth dispersion. The type of earnings risk faced by the richest is
also a potential explanation worth investigating.
Considerable work must still be done to better understand the quantitative
importance of each factor in determining wealth inequality and to understand
which models are most useful and computationally convenient to study it. The
recent advances in modelling have however already helped in providing a more
precise picture. The challenge now is improve these models even further and
to apply them to the study of several problems for which inequality is a key
determinant. For instance, the e®ects of several tax policies (in particular the
estate tax) might depend crucially on how wealth is concentrated in the hands
of the richest percentiles of the distribution. In the last section of this paper,
we highlight some of the areas in which models of inequality could and should
be pro¯tably employed and extended.
2 Data
We ¯rst summarize the main facts about the wealth distribution in the United
States, facts provided mainly by the Survey of Consumer Finances. We also
mention some facts about the historical trends, although in this paper we do
2not focus on understanding them (an area on which little work has been done
so far).
2.1 Data sources
The main source of microeconomic data on wealth for the United States is
the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)1 which, starting from 1983, every
three years collects detailed information about wealth for a cross-section of
households. It also includes a limited panel (between 1983 and 1989), as well as
a link to two previous smaller surveys (1962 Survey of Financial Characteristics
of Consumers and the 1963 Survey of Changes in Family Finances).
The SCF was explicitly designed to measure the balance sheet of house-
holds and the distribution of wealth. It has a large number of detailed questions
about di®erent assets and liabilities, which allows highly disaggregated data
analysis on each component of the total net worth of the household. More
importantly, the SCF oversamples rich households by including, in addition to
a national area probability sample (representing the entire population), a list
sample drawn from tax records (to extract a list of high income households).
Oversampling is especially important given the high degree of wealth concen-
tration observed in the data (see Davies and Shorrocks [31]). For this reason,
the SCF is able to provide a more accurate measure of wealth inequality and
of total wealth holdings: Curtin et al. [29] and Antoniewicz [6] document that
the total net worth implied by the SCF matches quite well the total wealth
implied by the (aggregate) Flow of Funds Accounts (although not perfectly,
especially when disaggregating the various components).
1The survey is publicly available from the Federal Reserve Board website at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/sc¯ndex.html.
3Unfortunately, the SCF does not follow households over time, unlike the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID2 is a longitudinal study,
which begun in 1968, and follows families and individuals over time. It focuses
on income and demographic variables, but since 1984 it has also included (every
5 years) a supplement with questions on wealth. The PSID includes a national
sample of low-income families, but it does not oversample the rich. As a result,
this data set is unable to describe appropriately the right tail of the wealth
distribution: Curtin et al. [29] show that the PSID tracks the distribution of
total household net worth implied by the SCF only up to the top 2%-3% of
richest household, but misses much of the wealth holdings of the top richest.
Given that the richest 5% hold more than half of the total net worth in the
United States, this is an important shortcoming.
Another important data source is the Health and Retirement Study (HRS),
which recently absorbed the Study of Assets and Health Dynamics Among the
Oldest Old (AHEAD). This survey focuses on the older households (from before
retirement and on), and provides a large amount of information regarding their
economic and health condition. However, as the PSID, this survey misses the
richest households.
Other data sets also contain some information on wealth and asset holdings
(for instance, the U.S. Bureau of Census's Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation, or, for the very richest, the data on the richest 400 people identi¯ed
by the Forbes magazine and, indirectly, the Internal Revenue Service data on
estate returns). However, because of its careful sample choice, the SCF re-
mains the main source of information about the distribution of wealth in the
United States. Due to their demographic and health data, the PSID and the
2See http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/.
4Percentile Year
group 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
0-49.9 2.7 3.3 3.6 3.0 2.8
50-89.9 29.9 29.7 28.6 28.4 27.4
90-94.9 13.0 12.6 11.9 11.4 12.1
95-98.9 24.1 24.4 21.3 23.3 25.0
99-100 30.3 30.2 34.6 33.9 32.7
Table 1: Percent of net worth held by various groups de¯ned in terms of
percentiles of the wealth distribution (taken from Kennickell [58], p. 9).
HRS provide additional information for studying the wealth holdings of most
households (except the richest).
2.2 Wealth concentration in the United States
The most striking aspect of the wealth distribution in the United States is
its degree of concentration. Table 1 shows that the households in the top 1%
of the wealth distribution hold around one third of the total wealth in the
economy, and those in the top 5% hold more than half. At the other extreme,
many households (more than 10%) have little or no assets at all.
The data in Table 1 and 2 refer to total net worth. There are many possible
measures of wealth, the most appropriate one depending on the problem ob-
ject of study. Net worth includes all assets held by the households (real estate,
¯nancial wealth, vehicles) net of all liabilities (mortgages and other debts); it
is thus a comprehensive measure of most marketable wealth. This measure
thus includes the value of most de¯ned contribution plans (such as IRAs), but
excludes the implied values of de¯ned bene¯t plans and social security. De¯ned
contribution plans can of course be important sources of income after retire-
5Net Year
worth 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
< $0 7.3 7.2 7.1 8.0 6.9
$0-$1,000 8.0 6.3 5.2 5.8 5.4
$1,000-$5,000 12.7 14.4 15.0 13.1 12.8
$25,000-$100,000 23.2 25.4 26.4 22.9 22.0
$100,000-$250,000 20.2 21.6 22.1 22.6 19.2
$250,000-$500,000 11.0 9.3 9.3 12.0 13.0
$500,000-$1,000,000 5.4 4.6 5.1 6.0 7.8
¸ $1,000,000 4.7 3.8 3.6 4.9 7.0
Table 2: Percent distribution of household net worth over wealth groups, 2001
dollars(taken from Kennickell [58], p. 9).
ment; but their measure is problematic because their value has to be imputed.
To study other questions it may be useful to look at more restricted measures
of wealth, that for example exclude less liquid assets (such as housing), and
focus on ¯nancial wealth instead. Throughout this paper, we focus on net
worth.3
The key facts about the distribution of wealth have been highlighted in a
large number of studies, among others in Wol® [96], [94], and Kennickell [58].
Wealth is extremely concentrated, and much more so than earnings and in-
come, as shown by D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez et al. [34] and Budria et al. [84]. For instance,
in 1992 the Gini index for labor earnings, income (inclusive of transfers) and
wealth were respectively .63, .57, and .78 (D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez et al. [34]), while in
1995 they were .61, .55 and .80 (Budria et al. [84]). These two studies also
3It must be noted that the exact de¯nition of net worth varies across studies. Therefore,
the numbers we cite below when referring to other works are not directly comparable, as
they may include di®erent sets of assets. However, the general picture of a highly skewed
distribution and the main trends are unchanged and do not depend on the exact measure
of wealth.
6Top % 1 5 10 20
Whole population
percentage of total net worth held 30 54 67 81
Entrepreneurs
percentage of households in a given percentile 63 49 39 28
percentage of net worth held in a given percentile 68 58 53 47
Table 3: Entrepreneurs and the distribution of wealth. SCF 1989.
report that the correlation between these three variables is positive, but far
from perfect.
There is also signi¯cant wealth inequality within various age and demo-
graphic groups. For instance, Venti and Wise [91] and Bernheim at al. [12]
show that wealth is highly dispersed at retirement even for people with similar
lifetime incomes, and argue that this di®erences cannot be explained only by
events such as family status, health and inheritances, nor by portfolio choice.
Several studies have also highlighted the di®erences in wealth holdings
across di®erent groups. There are large gaps in wealth holdings by race (see
for example Altonji and Doraszelski [3] and Smith [88]). Wol® [96] documents
that in the 1980s and 1990s the ratio of average net worth of blacks to the
one of whites was around 18%. Unfortunately little work has been done to
quantitatively understand the sources of this persistent di®erence across race
groups. (See White [92] for a study of how much of current black-white income
and wealth inequality can be explained by initial conditions at Emancipation.)
There is also a large di®erence in wealth holdings between entrepreneurs
and non-entrepreneurs, as shown in Table 3 (taken from Cagetti and De
Nardi [20]). Entrepreneurs4 are a small fraction of the population (about
4We classify as entrepreneurs the households who declare owning a privately held business
710%), but hold a large share of total wealth (about 40%). Table 3 shows that
entrepreneurs constitute a large fraction of the richest households: more than
60% of the households in the top 1%, and almost one-half of those in the top
5%, and they hold, respectively, 68% and 58% of the wealth held by households
in those percentiles. As shown also by Gentry and Hubbard [41], Quadrini [81],
and Buera [17], entrepreneurship is a key element to understand the wealth
concentration among the richest households.
Regarding household mobility, Hurst et al. [56] use PSID data to ana-
lyze the wealth dynamics between 1984 and 1994, for di®erent socio-economic
groups and for di®erent types of asset holdings, pointing out that most of
the mobility occurs in the midrange deciles, while the top and bottom ones
show high persistence. Unfortunately, the PSID does not allow to study what
happens at the top percentile. Using the same dataset, Quadrini [81] studies
the wealth mobility for entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, showing that en-
trepreneurs are more upwardly mobile. Because of the purely cross-sectional
nature of the SCF, it is di±cult to characterize the mobility of households
across the wealth distribution.
The key feature that we stress here is that the observed degree of wealth
concentration is much higher than the one of labor earnings and that, as we
will see in the sections about the models, generating saving behavior that is
consistent with these facts is not a trivial task.
(or a share of one), who have an active management role in it, and who have invested a
positive amount of wealth in such business. Alternative classi¯cations give very similar
results.
82.3 Savings, bequests and wealth accumulation
In addition to income di®erences, wealth inequality may be driven by di®er-
ences in the saving behavior, or in the intergenerational transfers received.
Analyzing the empirical evidence to tell apart di®erent potential sources of
wealth inequality is challenging.
Individual saving cannot be measured directly but must be computed from
other data, either as the ¯rst di®erence in wealth, or as income minus consump-
tion. For this reason there are fewer studies that document the heterogeneity
in saving rates; their ¯ndings suggest signi¯cant di®erences in saving behavior
across various groups. (See Browning and Lusardi [16] for a review of the lit-
erature.) Dynan et al. [35] show that higher-lifetime income households save
a larger fraction of their income than lower-income households. Quadrini [81]
documents that entrepreneurs, who tend to be among the richest households,
also exhibit higher saving rates.
Bequests also play an important role in shaping wealth inequality. Kotliko®
and Summers [60] were the ¯rst to argue that life-cycle savings for retirement
account for a small fraction of total capital accumulation, while intergenera-
tional transmission of wealth accounts for the vast majority of capital forma-
tion (with a baseline estimate of around 80% of the total). Further studies have
con¯rmed the importance of intergenerational transfers; for instance, Gale and
Scholz [40] ¯nd that bequests account for about 30% of total wealth accumu-
lation, and intended inter-vivos transfers account for an additional 20%.
It is more di±cult to measure the size of intended bequests relative to that
of purely accidental ones, due to uncertainty about the life-span. Hurd [54]
estimates a very low marginal utility from leaving bequests. Altonji and Vil-
lanueva [4] also ¯nd relatively small values for the elasticity of bequests to
9permanent income, although they do show that this number increases with
life-time resources. Most of the bequests, however, are concentrated among
the top wealth percentiles, a group that these papers ignore. Looking at a
sample of TIAA-CREF retirees (whose average wealth is higher than in the
other groups), Laitner and Juster [65] ¯nd that about half of the households in
their sample plan to leave estate and that the amount of wealth attributable
to estate building is signi¯cant, accounting for half or more of the total for
those who plan to leave bequests. While more empirical research is needed in
the area, it appears that intergenerational altruism and intended bequests are
a crucial element to understand the distribution of wealth, above all for the
very rich.
2.4 Wealth inequality outside the United States
While we focus on the United States, it is interesting to compare its wealth
distribution to that of other countries. The evidence on a few other, mostly
OECD countries is summarized in Wol® [95] and in Davies and Shorrocks [31],
to which we refer for the data and a discussion (including the caveats about
data quality for some countries). In all countries for which studies exist, wealth
is very unequally distributed, with Gini indexes ranging from .50 to .80, and
a wealth share for the top 5% of households ranging from around 25% to over
50%. Among these countries, the United States exhibits the highest degree of
wealth concentration, with the largest shares of total wealth in the hand of the
richest percentiles of the wealth distribution. The lowest values are found in,
among others, Australia, Italy, Japan and Sweden, and intermediate values in
Canada, France and the United Kingdom.
These data indicate that, while the main forces generating wealth inequal-
10ity seem to be common across developed countries, certain factors may di®er
across countries and reduce, or increase, inequality. Among these factors, pub-
lic policies such as taxation (estate taxation and progressive income taxation in
particular) tend to reduce wealth accumulation among the richest households,
and hence inequality. More research needs to be done to explain cross-country
di®erences (see De Nardi [32] as an application that tries to understand the
various determinants of inequality both in the United States and Sweden).
2.5 Trends in wealth inequality
It is di±cult to measure wealth inequality before the second half of the twen-
tieth century. For the United States some data exist (Census surveys in the
nineteenth century and other records of estates), but their interpretation is still
debated. Some argue that inequality has always been high and has changed
little from the end of the eighteenth century to the ¯rst decades of the twenti-
eth century (for example, Soltow [89]), while others argue for a sharp increase
in inequality over the period (among others, Lindert [68]). It is however inter-
esting to note that wealth inequality has always been substantial, and, even
according to Lindert [68], by 1860 the richest 1% held approximately 30% of
total wealth, an amount that remained more or less stable until the 1920's.
There is evidence that U.S. wealth inequality decreased signi¯cantly be-
tween the 1920 and the 1970s (Davies and Shorrocks [31], Wol® and Mar-
ley [97], and Kopczuk and Saez [59]). Wol® [94], for instance, documents that
the share of total wealth held by the top 1% of individuals fell from 38% in
1922 to 19% in 1976. As explained by Kopczuk and Saez [59], the decrease
took place between the onset of the Great Depression and the end of World
War II, and was most likely generated by the Depression and the New Deal
11policies that increased the tax burden for the wealthy. Given the continuing
high estate and income taxes, the top shares did not recover in the decades
after World War II. Inequality increased again in the 1980s. Wol® [93] argues
that while wealth inequality fell during the 1970s, it rose sharply after 1979,
with a dramatic increase over the 1980s, to the level o® in the 1990s. The
trend in the 1990s is much less clear. The decade saw a stockmarket boom
and the rise of some large internet fortunes, as well as increased income con-
centration (Piketty and Saez [78]). While Wol® [96] suggests a small increase
in wealth inequality over the decade, Kennickell [58], Kopczuk and Saez [59],
and Scholz [86] ¯nd that the share of total wealth in the hands of the richest
remained stable in the 1990s.
Some of these trends have also been observed in other countries (see Davies
and Shorrocks [31], Piketty et al. [77], and Saez [85]). As in the United States,
wealth inequality decreased in the U.K., Sweden and France during the ¯rst
half of the twentieth century. This decrease was especially strong in the U.K.,
where wealth inequality in previous centuries was at least as high, if not higher,
than in the United States. However in these countries, and unlike in the United
States, inequality kept decreasing signi¯cantly after World War II and until
the 1980s. In contrast, the United States experienced an increase in inequality
after the 1970s. Di®erent levels of income and estate taxation, which in the
last 50 years have been higher in these countries, might be responsible for the
di®erence in these dynamics.
3 Models
In the following sections we describe the models used so far to study wealth con-
centration. Most of these models are general-equilibrium, quantitative models
12with heterogeneous agents. For expositional purposes we classify these works
into three sub-categories: models with in¯nitely-lived dynasties, models with
overlapping-generations (OLG), and models that mix both of these features5.
The ¯rst type of models ignore the life-cycle structure, but consider each
dynasty as a single agent who lives forever. The second type explicitly intro-
duces an age and life-cycle structure, with various degrees of intergenerational
transmission of wealth and abilities. The third type relaxes the in¯nitely-
lived dynasty assumption of the ¯rst type of models, but greatly simpli¯es the
life-cycle structure.
Almost all the current general equilibrium, quantitative models of wealth
inequality are versions of Bewley models6. These are incomplete-markets mod-
els in which households are ex-ante identical7, in the sense that they face the
same stochastic labor earnings and ability processes, but are ex-post heteroge-
neous because they receive di®erent realizations of such shocks. These models
are typically solved for stationary equilibria in which, over time, there is a
constant distribution of people over the relevant state variables for the econ-
omy, but people move around in the distribution, and thus face considerable
uncertainty. This type of framework endogenously generate di®erences in asset
holdings, and hence wealth concentration, as a result of the household's desire
to save and the realization of the shocks. An exogenous earnings process is
typically the source of these shocks, and its properties are usually estimated
5As we further explain later on, this categorization does not always re°ect the chronolog-
ical order of the various contributions. Historically, the starting point of this literature was
Modigliani and Brumberg's [74] life-cycle model with certainty, which was then enriched in
various ways by several contributors.
6See Ljungqvist and Sargent [70] for an exposition of the properties of these models and
of their numerical solution.
7See Quadrini and R¶ ³os-Rull [83] for a discussion about why we need incomplete market
models to study wealth inequality.
13using micro-level data sets.
4 Dynasty models
4.1 A general framework
Let us consider the simplest version of a Bewley model with in¯nitely-lived
agents. There is a continuum of agents. All agents have identical preferences,










where u(ct) is the constant relative-risk aversion °ow of utility from consump-
tion. The labor endowment of each household is given by an idiosyncratic
labor productivity shock z that assumes a ¯nite number of possible values and
follows a ¯rst order Markov process with transition matrix (¡(z)). There is
only one asset, a, that people can use to self-insure against earnings risk.
A constant returns to scale production technology converts aggregate cap-
ital (K) and aggregate labor (L) into aggregate output (Y ).
During each period each household chooses how much to consume (c) and
save for next period by holding risk free assets (a0). The household's state
variables are denoted by x = (a;z), where a is asset holdings carried into the
period and z is the labor shock endowment.
The household's recursive problem can thus be written as












0 = (1 + r)a + zw
c ¸ 0; a
0 ¸ a
where r is the interest rate net of taxes and depreciation, w is the wage, and
a is a net borrowing limit8. For simplicity, we have not explicitly introduce
taxes and government policies, but of course the setup can easily accomodate
various types of taxes and transfers.
At every point in time this model economy can be described by a probability
distribution of people over assets a and earnings shocks z.
A stationary equilibrium for this economy is a set of consumption and
saving rules, prices, aggregate capital and labor, and invariant distribution of
households over the state variables of the system such that:
1. Given prices, the decision rules solve the household's recursive problem
described above.
2. Aggregate capital is equal to total savings of all of the households of the
economy, while aggregate labor is equal to total labor supplied by all of
the households of the economy.
3. Prices, that is the interest rate and the wage rate, gross of taxes, equal
the marginal product of capital, net of depreciation, and the marginal
product of labor.
4. The constant distribution of people is the one induced by the law of
motion of the system, which is determined by the exogenous earnings
8See Bewley [14], Aiyagari [1], Huggett [52] and Ljungqvist and Sargent [70] for more
exhausting descriptions of this framework and its equilibrium.
15shocks and by the endogenous policy functions of the households.
Quadrini and R¶ ³os-Rull [83] nicely summarize the results obtained from
this type of models until 1997 with the ¯rst three lines of Table 4.
% wealth in top
Gini 1% 5% 20%
U.S. data
.78 29 53 80
Baseline Aiyagari
.38 3.2 12.2 41.0
High variability Aiyagari
.41 4.0 15.6 44.6
Quadrini: entrepreneurs
.74 24.9 45.8 73.2
Table 4: Dynasty models of wealth inequality.
Most of the models in Table 4 display signi¯cantly less wealth concentration
than in the data. The reason why households save in this type of models is to
create a bu®er stock of assets to self-insure against earnings °uctuations (as
discussed by Carroll [24]). Once such bu®er stock is reached, the agents don't
save any more, and the model is thus not capable to explain the creation of
large fortunes.
Di®erences in wealth holdings are generated by random earnings shocks.
Households hit by a series of negative shocks use part of this bu®er stock of
wealth, and thus become poorer, relative to those who have had a series of
positive shocks. Larger earnings shocks may thus generate more dispersion.
Lines two and three of the table compare two identical economies, except for
the fact that the second one displays much higher earnings variability than
the ¯rst one (and thus higher cross-sectional earnings inequality) and show
16that second economy does generate a slightly more concentrated distribution
of wealth.
The table shows however that earnings shocks alone cannot generate a
level of wealth inequality comparable to that found in the data9. The reason
is that there is no mechanism that induces the richer people to keep saving at
high rates. Indeed, the model implies that richer households, having reached
high levels of wealth, should save at lower rates (or even dissave) than poorer
households, who instead need to rebuild their bu®er stock. This implication is
in contrast with the empirical studies on saving rates (see for example Dynan
et al. [35] and Quadrini [81]).
Allowing for heterogeneity in households' earnings processes may generate
di®erent levels of bu®er stocks of wealth across people. This e®ect is quantita-
tively not strong enough to generate a signi¯cant increase in wealth inequality
when the earnings volatility used is consistent with those estimated in micro
studies (see Carroll [24] and Quadrini and R¶ ³os-Rull [83]). Regarding het-
erogeneity in earnings across educational groups, various estimates (see for
example Cunha et al. [28]) show that earnings variability decreases with edu-
cation. This implies, everything else equal, that people with lower education
have higher saving rates. If one were to use these estimated di®erences in
earnings shocks in a model with di®erent educational groups, one would thus
¯nd (everything else equal) less wealth dispersion than in the case in which
the same volatility for all groups is assumed.
9This observation assumes that ones uses micro-level data set to estimate the level of the
individual's earnings volatility. As discussed in section 6, much higher variability may give
di®erent results.
174.2 Extensions of the basic model
The failure of the basic model to explain wealth inequality suggests that one
needs to look at other mechanisms. Two such mechanisms are entrepreneurship
and preference heterogeneity.
The setup presented so far assumes implicitly that the agents are employed
workers, who receive some labor income. Entrepreneurs, however, face a dif-
ferent decision problem, as their income is related to their business. A more
recent contribution by Quadrini [82] introduces entrepreneurial choice in a dy-
nastic framework: during each period the households decide whether to be
entrepreneurs or not. Quadrini ¯nds that a calibrated version of his model
can generate a much larger amount of wealth concentration in the hands of
the richest. In his model, three elements are crucial to generate this result.
First, the existence of capital market imperfections induces workers that have
entrepreneurial ideas to accumulate more wealth to reach minimal capital re-
quirements. Second, in the presence of costly ¯nancial intermediation, the
interest rate on borrowing is higher than the return from saving, therefore an
entrepreneur whose net worth is negative faces a higher marginal return from
saving and reducing his debt. Third, there is additional risk associated with
being an entrepreneur, hence risk averse individuals will save more. Quadrini
chooses some of the parameters of his model to match moments of the dis-
tribution of wealth and he comes much closer to ¯tting the upper tail of the
wealth distribution than the previous models, although his model still does
not generate enough asset holdings in the hands of the very richest compared
to the data.
Another mechanism that has been used to generate wealth inequality is
heterogeneity in preferences. The decision to save depends crucially on the
18speci¯c parameter values of the utility function. In particular, a higher degree
of patience (summarized by a higher discount factor ¯) leads people to save
more. In the presence of precautionary savings, a higher coe±cient of risk
aversion may also induce higher savings.
Krusell and Smith [61] generalize the basic framework by adding a stochas-
tic process for the dynasty's preferences (both discount factor and risk aver-
sion). The discount factor (or the risk aversion) changes on average every
generation and is meant to recover the fact that parents and children in the
same dynasty may have di®erent preferences. Krusell and Smith ¯nd that it
is possible to ¯nd a stochastic process for the dynasties' discount factor to
match the variance of the cross-sectional distribution of wealth, while uncer-
tainty about risk aversion does not a®ect the results much (although, as shown
by Cagetti [18], the results are very sensitive to the values for the utility pa-
rameters chosen). While capturing the variance, their model fails to match the
extreme degree of concentration of wealth in the hands of the richest 1%.
There is empirical evidence of heterogeneity in preferences, in particular in
the discount factor (as show for instance by Lawrance [66] and Cagetti [19]),
and this may play an important role in shaping wealth inequality. Given
Krusell and Smith's results, however, preference heterogeneity alone does not
seem su±cient to replicate the observed wealth concentration.
One possibility is to enrich the functional form for the utility function.
D¶ ³az, Pijoan-Mas, and R¶ ³os-Rull [33] study the e®ect of habit formation in
preferences and ¯nd that introducing habit formation decreases the concen-
tration of wealth generated by this type of models and is hence not helpful in
reconciling the models with the key features of wealth concentration.
Yet another possibility is to assume directly that wealth per se enters the
utility function. Carroll [25] concentrates on the fact that in the data house-
19holds with higher levels of lifetime income have higher lifetime saving rates
(see Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes [35] and Lillard and Karoly [67]). He shows
that neither standard life-cycle, nor dynastic models can recover the saving
behavior of rich and poor families at the same time. To solve this puzzle he
suggests a \capitalist spirit" model, in which ¯nitely lived consumers have
wealth in the utility function. This can be calibrated to make wealth a luxury
good, thus rendering nonhomothetic preferences.
5 Overlapping-generations models
5.1 Life-cycle models
The models described in the previous section ignore the life-cycle dimensions of
the saving decision and only roughly approximate intergenerational linkages.
The life-cycle theory of consumption was ¯rst developed by Modigliani
and Brumberg [74]. In their framework a household chooses consumption
by maximizing the discounted utility from consumption over a lifespan of T
years, subject to a lifetime resource constraint. In its simplest form, the utility
function for a household is given by U(c1;:::;cT), and the resources available









where N denotes the number of working years. This theory has implications
for wealth inequality: households save while working, reach a maximum wealth
level at retirement age, and then decumulate their savings after retirement.
The life-cycle component of wealth inequality, however, is too small to ex-
20plain the observed wealth concentration in the data. Atkinson [7] ¯rst showed
that even allowing for earnings growth and uncertain life-spans the model can-
not generate the wealth concentration measured in the richest decile. Wolf-
son [98] argued that the inclusion of further factors such as di®erences in earn-
ings, rates of return and family formation still cannot replicate the empirical
concentration.
A crucial element not incorporated in these models is the intergenerational
transmission of wealth. Becker and Tomes [10] were the ¯rst to model explicitly
the parental decision problem, by assuming that parents are altruistic and
thus value transfers to their o®spring. They characterize the structure of such
transfers across generations, in the form of both human capital and bequests,
and show that in the presence of constraints, parental transfers are ¯rst in the
form of human capital, and only after the optimal amount of human capital
has been reached they do take the form of monetary transfers such as bequests.
Bequests are thus a luxury good in this framework.
The impact of bequests was soon shown to be potentially relevant. Among
the earlier, partial equilibrium exercises, Davies [30] studies the e®ects of vari-
ous factors, including bequests, on economic inequality in a one-period model
without uncertainty. In his setup one generation of parents care about their
children's future consumption, and there is regression to the mean between
parents and children's earnings. As a consequence, the income elasticity of
bequests is high and inherited wealth is a major cause of wealth inequality.
The stage was thus set to build and study quantitative models with a life-
cycle structure and overlapping generation, which was accomplished by Lait-
ner [63], who developed a model with two sided altruism among generations,
constraints on net worth being non negative, and random lifetime earnings
(abstracting thus from life-span uncertainty and earnings shocks). In this
21setup intergenerational transfers are a luxury good and liquidity constraints
are less binding for generations receiving larger transfers. This economy can
also generate realistic capital to output ratios, but Laitner did not explore the
implications of his model for wealth inequality.
We now turn to the models that build on this earlier literature and we
discuss their quantitative ¯ndings.
5.2 A benchmark OLG framework
We use Huggett's [52] formulation as a benchmark OLG. Each period a con-
tinuum of agents are born. They live at most N periods, and face an age-
dependent survival probability st of surviving up to age t, conditional on sur-
viving up to age t ¡ 1. The demographic patterns are stable, so age t agents
make up a constant fraction ¹t of the population at every point in time.
All agents have identical preferences, and have the following utility function















where u(ct) is the constant relative-risk aversion °ow of utility from consump-
tion, and the expected value is computed with respect to the household's earn-
ings shocks.
The labor endowment of each household is given by a function e(z;t), which
depends on the agent's age t, and on an idiosyncratic labor productivity shock
z, that assumes a ¯nite number of possible values and that follows a ¯rst order
Markov chain with transition matrix ¡(z).
22There are no annuity markets10. People save to insure against earnings risk,
for retirement, and in case they live a long life. People that die prematurely
leave accidental bequests.
There is a constant returns to scale production technology that converts
aggregate capital (K) and labor (L) into output (Y ).
During each period each household choose how much to consume (c) and
save for next period by holding risk free assets (a0). The household's state
variables are denoted by x = (a;z), where a is asset holdings carried into the
period and z is the labor shock endowment.
The household's recursive problem can be written as:












0 = (1 + r)a + e(z;t)w + T + bt
c ¸ 0; a
0 ¸ a and a
0 ¸ 0 if t = N;
where r is the interest rate net of taxes and depreciation, w is the wage net
of taxes, T are accidental bequests that left by all of the deceased in a period,
which are assumed to be redistributed by the government to all people alive,
and bt are social security payments to the retirees. Modelling explicitly social
security is important because social security redistributes a signi¯cant fraction
of income from the young to the old and thus reduces the saving rate and
changes the aggregate capital-output ratio.
10This is a very common assumption given how small the annuity market is in practice.
Eichenbaum and Peled [37] show that in the presence of moral hazard people will choose to
self-insure rather than use annuity markets even if the rate of return on annuities is high.
23At every point in time this model economy can be described by a probability
distribution of people over age t, assets a , and earnings shocks z.
A stationary equilibrium for this economy can be de¯ned analogously to the
one described for the in¯nitely-lived model, with the additional requirements
that during each period total lump-sum transfers received by the households
alive equal accidental bequests left by the deceased, and the government budget
constraint balances every period.
Huggett [52] calibrates this model economy to key features of the U.S. data
and uses di®erent versions of it to quantify how much wealth inequality can
be generated using a pure life-cycle model with labor earnings shocks and un-
certain life span. The paper succeeds in matching the U.S. Gini coe±cient for
wealth, but the concentration is obtained by having too many people holding
little wealth and by not concentrating enough wealth in the upper tail of the
wealth distribution. The key reason of this failure is that in the data the rich
(people with high permanent income) have a very high saving rate, while in
the model households that have accumulated a su±ciently high bu®er stock
of assets and retirement saving don't keep saving until they reach huge levels
of wealth. Huggett ¯nds that relaxing the household's borrowing constraint
increases the fraction of people bunched at zero or negative wealth, but does
not increase much the asset holdings of the rich, and hence does not help in
generating a distribution of wealth closer to the observed one.
Huggett also studies the amount of wealth inequality generated by his
model at di®erent ages and ¯nds that, starting from age 40, the model un-
derpredicts the amount of wealth inequality by age. This point is further
studied by a recent work by Hendricks [49], who focuses on the performance
of various models on cross-sectional wealth inequality at retirement age. Hen-
dricks shows that, at retirement age, his (simpli¯ed) version of an OLG model
24overstates wealth di®erences between earnings-rich and earnings-poor, while
it understates the amount of wealth inequality conditional on similar lifetime
earnings. Yang [99] uses a framework with a more realistic life cycle structure,
borrowing constraints, and voluntary and accidental bequests. She ¯nds that
the model's implications are quantitatively consistent with the ones observed
in the data. The model that she uses is a version of De Nardi's [32], which we
describe next.
5.3 Adding bequest motives
De Nardi [32] introduces two types of intergenerational links in the OLG model
used by Huggett: voluntary bequests and transmission of human capital. She
models the utility from bequests as providing \warm glow" (as in Andreoni [5]).
In this framework parents and their children are linked by voluntary and ac-
cidental bequests and by the transmission of earnings ability. The households
thus save to self-insure against labor earnings shocks and life-span risk, for
retirement, and possibly to leave bequests to their children.
Compared to Huggett, there is thus an extra term in the value function of
a retired person that faces a positive probability of death:
V (a;t) = max
c;a0
n
u(c) + st¯EtV (a












The utility from leaving bequests thus depends on two parameters: Á1, which
represents the strength of the bequest motive, and Á2, which measures the
extent to which bequests are a luxury good. These two parameters are respec-
25tively calibrated to match Kotliko® and Summers's [60] data on the fraction
of capital due to intergenerational transfers, and to match one moment of the
observed distribution of bequests.
Transfer Percentage wealth in the top Percentage with
wealth Wealth negative or
ratio Gini 1% 5% 20% 40% 60% zero wealth
U.S. data
.60 .78 29 53 80 93 98 5.8{15.0
No intergenerational links, equal bequests to all
.67 .67 7 27 69 90 98 17
No intergenerational links, unequal bequests to children
.38 .68 7 27 69 91 99 17
One link: parent's bequest motive
.55 .74 14 37 76 95 100 19
Both links: parent's bequest motive and productivity inheritance
.60 .76 18 42 79 95 100 19
Table 5: OLG models of wealth inequality, from De Nardi [32]
Table 5 summarizes her results. The ¯rst line of the table refers to the
U.S. data. The second one to a version of Huggett's model economy in which
there are only accidental bequests, which are redistributed equally to all peo-
ple alive every year. The third line also refers to an economy in which there
are only accidental bequests, but these are received by the children of the de-
ceased upon their parent's death, and are thus unequally distributed. This
experiment shows that accidental bequests, even if unequally distributed, do
not generate a more unequal distribution. This is because receipt of a bequest
per se does not alter the saving behavior of the richest. This experiment also
highlights the fact that the Auerbach and Kotliko®'s measure on intergenera-
tional transfers is sensitive to the timing of transfers: if children inherit only
26once, when their parent dies (rather than every year as in line three), this
measure generates a fraction of wealth due to intergenerational transfers that
is much lower than the one computed by Huggett. The fourth line allows for
a voluntary bequest motive, and shows that voluntary bequests can explain
the emergence of large estates, which are often accumulated in more than one
generation, and characterize the upper tail of the wealth distribution in the
data. The ¯fth line allows for both voluntary bequests and transmission of
ability and shows that a human-capital link, through which children partially
inherit the productivity of their parents, generates an even more concentrated
wealth distribution. More productive parents accumulate larger estates and
leave larger bequests to their children, who, in turn, are more productive than
average in the workplace.
The presence of a bequest motive also generates lifetime saving pro¯les
more consistent with the data: saving for precautionary purposes (emphasized
in particular by Carroll [24]) and saving for retirement are the primary factors
for wealth accumulation at the lower tail of the distribution, while saving to
leave bequests signi¯cantly a®ects the shape of the upper tail. Also, with this
parameterization of the voluntary bequest motive, and consistently with the
data, the rich elderly do not decumulate their assets as fast as predicted by a
standard a OLG model.
De Nardi ¯nds that Á2 is a large number, so bequests are a luxury good,
and that the extent to which they are a luxury good is key in generating more
concentration in the hands of the richest and producing a more realistic lifetime
savings pro¯les (many papers that do not ¯nd evidence in favor of a bequest
motive, such as Hurd [54] and Hendricks [49], assume that Á2 = 0.) With this
parameterization, and consistently with the data, the bequest motive to save is
much stronger for the richest households, who, even when very old, keep some
27assets to leave to their children. The rich leave more wealth to their o®spring,
who, in turn, tend to do the same. This behavior generates some large estates
that are transmitted across generations because of the voluntary bequests,
while being quantitatively consistent with the elasticity of the savings of the
elderly to permanent income that has been estimated from microeconomic data
(Altonji and Villanueva [4]).
It is clear from this table that, although modeling explicitly both of these
mechanisms does help to better explain the the savings of the richest, De
Nardi's model is not capable of matching the wealth concentration of the rich-
est 1% of the people.
5.4 Other extensions
Heer [48] adopts a model in which richer and poorer people have di®erent
tastes for leaving bequests. His characterization of the labor income process
(people can be employed or unemployed) does not generate enough income
inequality compared with the data and his model does not produce large wealth
concentration.
Hendricks [50] studies the e®ects of allowing for preference heterogeneity
in a life-cycle framework with only accidental bequests. Consistently with
Krusell and Smith [61], he ¯nds that heterogeneity in risk aversion has only
minimal e®ects on saving and wealth inequality. Moreover, he shows that time
preference heterogeneity only makes a modest contribution in accounting for
high wealth observations if the heterogeneity in discount factor is chosen to
generate realistic patterns of consumption and wealth inequality as cohorts
age.
Hubbard Skinner and Zeldes [51] focus on the e®ects of social insurance
28programs on wealth holdings of poorer people because micro data ¯nd a sig-
ni¯cant group in the population with little wealth. They show that in presence
of precautionary savings the asset-based means testing of welfare programs can
imply that a signi¯cant fraction of people with lower lifetime earnings do not
accumulate wealth.
Gokhale et al. [42] aim at evaluating how much wealth inequality at re-
tirement age arises from inheritance inequality. To do so, they construct an
overlapping-generations model that allows for random death, random fertility,
assortative mating, heterogeneous human capital, progressive income taxation
and social security. All of these elements are exogenous and calibrated to the
data. The families are assumed not to care about their o®spring, hence all
bequests are involuntary. To solve the model, they impose that individuals are
in¯nitely risk averse and that the rate of time preference equals the interest
rate. In their framework inheritances in the presence of social security play
an important role in generating intra-generational wealth inequality at retire-
ment. The intuition is that social security annuitizes completely the savings
of poor and middle-income people but is a very small fraction of the wealth of
richer people, who thus keep assets to insure against life-span risk.
6 Mixtures of life-cycle and dynastic behavior
The third class of models mixes features of both life-cycle models and in¯nitely-
lived dynasties, simplifying some aspects of either model to make them more
computationally tractable.
Among these works, Laitner [64] assumes that all households save for life-
cycle purposes, but only some of them care about their own descendants.
There are perfect annuity markets, therefore all bequests are voluntary, and
29no earning risk over the life cycle, hence no precautionary savings. Laitner's
model is simple to compute and provides a number of interesting insights.
The concentration in the upper tail of the wealth distribution is matched by
choosing the fraction of households that behave as a dynasty and also depends
on the assumptions on the distribution of wealth within the dynasty.
Nishiyama [75] adopts an OLG model with bequests and intervivos trans-
fers in which households in the same family line behave strategically. As De
Nardi, he concludes that the model with intergenerational transfers better
explains, although not fully, the observed wealth distribution.
Casta~ neda, D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez and R¶ ³os{Rull [27] consider a model economy
populated by dynastic households that have some life-cycle °avor: workers
have a constant probability of retiring at each period and once they are retired
they face a constant probability of dying. Each household is perfectly altruistic
toward its household. The paper employs a number of parameters to match
some features of the U.S. data, including measures of wealth inequality.
The key feature of the model that generates huge amount of wealth holdings
in the hands of the richest is the productivity shocks process. This process is
calibrated so that the highest productivity level is more than 100 times higher
than the second highest. There thus is an enormous discrepancy between
the highest productivity level and all of the others. Moreover, if one is at
the highest productivity level, the chance of being 100 times less productive
during the next period is more than 20%. High-ability households thus face
much higher earnings risk, save at very high rates to self-insure against earnings
risk, and thus build huge bu®er stocks of assets.
Building on Quadrini [81], Cagetti and De Nardi [20] take seriously the
observation that entrepreneurs, that is, households that own and manage
privately-held businesses, make up for the largest fraction of rich people in the
30data. Cagetti and De Nardi [20] assume that households have two types of abil-
ity: entrepreneurial ability (µ), and worker's ability (y). The entrepreneurial
ability is linked to the capacity to produce income out of capital according to
the following production function:
ye = µk
º;
where ye is income from being an entrepreneur during a period and investing
working capital k, and º is the degree of decreasing returns to scale, or \span-
of-control," as in Lucas [71]. The worker's ability is linked to the ability to
earn income when working for someone else, where the worker's income in a
period is given by:
yw = wy;
where w is the market wage.
During each period, the individual observes his abilities (which evolve
stochastically over time), and makes an occupational choice for that period.
Contracts are imperfectly enforceable: people repay the amount they own only
if it is in their own interest to do so, as in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn [2]. Be-
cause of this friction, the amount that an entrepreneur can borrow is a function
of his own wealth, which thus acts as collateral. The ¯rm size can thus be sub-
optimal, and richer households are able to borrow more and grow faster. The
model adopts a demographic structure similar to Casta~ neda, D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez
and R¶ ³os{Rull [27], and can thus incorporate the transmission of wealth, and
of businesses, across generations.
Compared to Quadrini, Cagetti and De Nardi obtain a much better ¯t of the
upper tail of the wealth distribution by endogenizing the ¯rm size distribution.
31They do not choose any of the parameter of their model to generate this result,
which should hence be interpreted as a check of the goodness of the model.
The key reason why their model succeeds in generating this large amount of
wealth concentration is linked to the fact that, while entrepreneurs could invest
capital at a higher rate of return, the presence of borrowing constraints and
collateral requirements makes the entrepreneur to save to exploit the high rate
of return even when the entrepreneur becomes \rich". This key intuition does
not depend on the demographic structure assumed, and would also hold in a
dynastic model. Cagetti and De Nardi chose to formulate it in an economy
with more realistic life-cycle features to study the e®ects of government policies
such as estate taxation. The life-cycle structure makes it possible to study the
e®ects of government policies such as estate taxation on wealth inequality and
capital accumulation (see Cagetti and De Nardi [21]).
7 Future directions
In the previous sections, we have discussed if and to what extent the current
economic models have been able to explain the determinants of wealth inequal-
ity in the United States. While the baseline versions of the standard economic
models badly fail to replicate the degree of wealth concentration observed in
the data, some extensions have had a much greater success.
As we learn more about the determinants of wealth concentration, we can
start applying new frameworks to study many economic problems for which
inequality is a key element. In what follows, we brie°y discuss some of these
areas. This discussion, of course, is by no means complete.
327.1 Human capital
All quantitative models of wealth inequality that we are aware of take hu-
man capital as exogenous. As documented by Huggett et al. [53], modelling
human capital investment in presence of heterogenous learning abilities and
exogenous shocks is important to reproduce the data on earnings inequal-
ity over the life cycle. Modeling human capital explicitly would also allow
a better measurement of the relative importance of human capital formation
relative to bequests in generating wealth inequality, in the spirit of Becker and
Tomes [10], especially when human capital acquisition is limited by imperfect
¯nancial markets (as for instance in the analysis of Heckman et al. [47]). For
these reasons it would be worthwhile to study saving decisions and wealth in-
equality in a framework that also considers human capital accumulation and
disentagles the permanent and transitory sources of inequality as in Huggett
et al. [53].
7.2 Portfolio choice
The models we have discussed typically assume only one riskless asset, or at
most two when entrepreneurial investment is included. An important issue,
however, is portfolio choice. Gollier [43] provides a survey about the theory of
household portfolios, Haliassos and Michaelides [45] discuss techniques for cal-
ibrating and solving household portfolio models, while Miniaci and Weber [36]
focus on the econometric issues in the estimation of household portfolio models.
Households' portfolio are very heterogeneous by age, income or occupation
(see for instance Bertaut and Starr-McCluer [13], Poterba and Samwick [80],
Banks et al. [9], Heaton and Lucas [46], Carroll [26], Hurd [55], and Yang [101]).
Some papers have started to study portfolio choice with heterogeneous
33agents in a life-cycle setting. For example, Campbell et al. [22] and Campbell
and Viceira [23] have shown that the fraction of risky assets in the portfolio
should decrease with age as people move closer to retirement, and Benzoni
et al. [11] have further quali¯ed the relation between age, income and asset
positions.
For entrepreneurial households business wealth constitutes a relevant frac-
tion of their total net worth. Heaton and Lucas [46] study the e®ect of business
assets on portfolio choice and asset pricing.
A large fraction of total wealth for most households is in the form of hous-
ing, a relatively illiquid and indivisible type of investment, with unique risk
and tax characteristics. While standard ¯nance models focus on other types
of risky assets, recent works have explicitly modeled housing. For instance,
Yao and Zhang [102] show that inclusion of housing dramatically changes the
fraction of risky and riskless assets held in a portfolio, and Flavin and Ya-
mashita [39] examine the life-cycle pattern of portfolio composition induced by
lumpy housing investment. Yang [100] develops a quantitative, dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model which, consistently with the consumption data over the
life cycle, generates both hump-shaped consumption pro¯les for non-housing
goods and lack of decrease of housing consumption later in life.
Poterba [79] studies the e®ects of taxation on portfolio choice. In the
data, households with di®erent wealth levels hold very di®erent portfolios (Car-
roll [26]). In order to understand the aggregate impact of portfolio decisions
and taxation on aggregate investment and equilibrium prices it is vital to
consider how wealth is distributed in the population, and in particular, to
understand the saving and portfolio of all households, including the richest
ones, who hold a disproportionate share of total wealth. The models of wealth
inequality presented in this paper may help shed light on these issues.
347.3 Public policy: adequacy of savings
Wealth inequality is also vital to understand policy and redistributional issues.
While wealth inequality is often seen per se as a negative aspect that must
be addressed by redistributional policies, a di®erent question is whether the
observed levels of wealth for most households outside of the richest percentiles
are in fact in some way suboptimal and inadequate.
There has been some debate on the adequacy of savings. Some economists
believe that the wealth holding of many (or most) households are too low. Most
of these works are based on some form of myopia or inconsistency in prefer-
ences, as for instance in Lusardi [72] or in models with hyperbolic discounting
as in Laibson et al. [62]. Given this lack of foresight or commitment, house-
holds tend to save less than it is optimal, and thus government intervention
may improve welfare.
In contrast, other works have shown that the currently observed levels of
wealth are consistent with a rational, optimizing life-cycle model of wealth
accumulation. For instance, Engen et al. [38] show that the amount of sav-
ings of most households (except those at the bottom quartile of the wealth
distribution) is similar if not larger than that implied by a standard life-cycle
model of wealth accumulation with social security and retirement bene¯ts,
while Scholz et al. [87] argue that, even for most households in the bottom of
the distribution, the wealth de¯cit, relative to the optimal target, is generally
small.
The key element of these works is the current level of social security bene-
¯ts and other transfers after retirement. While the individual decisions may be
optimal given those policies, an entirely di®erent questions is whether the cur-
rent amount of social security is optimal, and whether aggregate welfare may
35be improved by di®erent schemes and di®erent saving program incentives such
as IRAs. There is a vast literature on this topic, and the question remains, to
a large extent, unresolved. We will not try to summarize the various positions,
but we point out that careful quantitative models of wealth inequality can help
shed light on the issue.
7.4 Public policy: tax reforms
An area of public policy that crucially depend on wealth inequality is taxation,
in particular for those taxes that mainly hit the richest households, such as
estate and progressive income taxes.
Given the current exemption levels, a very small fraction of people pays
any estate tax (approximately 2% of estates are taxed), and the aggregate
revenue for the tax is a relatively small .3% of GDP. However, the households
that pay the tax are also those who do most of the saving and hold a large
fraction of total wealth. Therefore, their behavior may have a large e®ect on
the aggregates in the economy.
Reforms of these taxes are now being actively debated. To understand the
impact of such reforms, it is important to understand how many of these rich
households are a®ected, and and how strongly they are a®ected. Quantitative
models that carefully analyze the determinants of wealth inequality are thus
key to study the problem. Using such models, Meh [73] studies changes in
the degree of tax progressivity in Quadrini's [82] model, and Cagetti and De
Nardi [21] study estate and income taxation in their setup.
367.5 Macroeconomics and the representative agent
When analyzing the e®ects of aggregate shocks, macroeconomics typically as-
sumes a representative agent. This allows a considerable simpli¯cation, at the
cost of ignoring the e®ect of heterogeneity in the population. While heterogene-
ity may be irrelevant for studying some macroeconomic problems, Browning
et al. [15] have argued that in certain cases the behavior of an economy with
many agents is signi¯cantly di®erent from that of a representative agent one.
Few works so far have been able to address the issue. The di±culty lies in the
fact that with heterogeneity and aggregate shocks, the distribution of people
over state variables may change over time, and, at least in theory, one needs to
keep track of the distribution as an additional state variable. The Bewley-type
of models studied so far consider steady states without aggregate shocks, in
which therefore the distribution is constant. But in the presence of aggregate
shocks this is not true anymore.
Krusell and Smith [61] were the ¯rst to solve a model with aggregate pro-
ductivity shocks and heterogeneous agents. They ¯nd that in their model
heterogeneity does not matter for aggregate movements, a result partly con-
¯rmed also by Storesletten et al. [90], who extend their setup to a life-cycle
economy. In this economy, heterogeneity may have consequences for mobility
and individual welfare, but does not a®ect the aggregate movements due to
the business cycle. It is exactly because of this irrelevance that these authors
are able to solve their models numerically. When the distribution has little
e®ect on the aggregates, it ceases to be a signi¯cant state variable, and one
need only keep track of it its mean, or at most its variance.
While they generate wealth inequality, these models fail to replicate the
extreme degree of wealth concentration and the fraction of wealth held by the
37richest percentiles. As argued before, the behavior of this group may be quite
di®erent from that of the median households. Entrepreneurship, for instance,
may imply di®erent responses of investment and savings to aggregate shocks.
Incorporating the insights of the models that study wealth concentration into
a setup with aggregate shocks is very interesting, but poses a considerable
computational challenge. It is necessary to solve the decision problem for a
large number of agents (as in a standard Bewley model), while at the same time
keeping track of the distribution of wealth (a function) as a state variable. As
computational power increases and new algorithms are developed, more and
more of these problems may start to be tackled.
7.6 Entrepreneurship, wealth and growth
In the paper, we have highlighted the role of entrepreneurs in determining
capital accumulation and wealth inequality in the United States. Unfortu-
nately, little empirical evidence exists for the role of entrepreneurs in shaping
wealth inequality in other countries. However, several studies suggests that
entrepreneurs are important also in other countries.
Among these, Banerjee and Newman [8] develop a framework to study how
initial wealth inequality shapes entrepreneurial decisions and in turn develop-
ment. In the presence of capital market imperfections, only richer households
can become entrepreneurs and create large ¯rms. Thus, business formation
and growth depend on the wealth distribution, which is in turn dynamically
determined by entrepreneurial decisions.
The evidence from Thailand studied in Paulson and Townsend [76] shows
that ¯nancial constraint are key to determine business start-up, and wealthier
households are more likely to start a business and face less stringent con-
38straints. Furthermore, entrepreneurship and ¯nancial deepening can account
for a signi¯cant fraction of the growth in total factor productivity in Thailand
(as found by Jeong and Townsend [57]), and their e®ect depends crucially on
the wealth distribution.
More data and empirical research on entrepreneurship may thus be key to
understand wealth accumulation and the implied wealth distribution not only
for developed, but also for developing countries.
39References
[1] S. Rao Aiyagari. Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 109(3):659{684, August 1994.
[2] Rui Albuquerque and Hugo A. Hopenhayn. Optimal dynamic lending contracts with
imperfect enforceability. Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
[3] Joseph G. Altonji and Ulrich Doraszelski. The role of permanent income and de-
mographics in black/white di®erences in wealth. Yale University, Economic Growth
Center Discussion Papers, 2002.
[4] Joseph G. Altonji and Ernesto Villanueva. The marginal propensity to spend on adult
children. NBER Working Paper 9811, July 2003.
[5] James Andreoni. Giving with impure altruism: Applications to charity and ricardian
equivalence. Journal of Political Economy, 97:1447{1458, 1989.
[6] Rochelle L. Antoniewicz. A comparison of the household sector from the °ow of funds
accounts and the survey of consumer ¯nances. Mimeo, October 2000.
[7] Anthony B. Atkinson. The distribution of wealth and the individual life-cycle. Oxford
Economic Papers, 23(2):239{254, July 1971.
[8] Abhijit V. Banerjee and Andrew F. Newman. Occupational choice and the process of
development. Journal of Political Economy, 102(2):274{298, April 1993.
[9] James Banks, Richard Blundell, and James P. Smith. Understanding di®erences in
household ¯nancial wealth between the United States and Great Britain. Journal of
Human Resources, 38(2):241{279, Spring 2003.
[10] Gary Becker and Nigel Tomes. Human capital and the rise and fall of families. Journal
of Labor Economics, 4(3):S1{S39, July 1979.
[11] Luca Benzoni, Pierre Collin-Dufresne, and Robert S. Goldstein. Portfolio choice over
the life-cycle in the presence of 'trickle down' labor income. Mimeo, 2004.
[12] B. Douglas Bernheim, Jonathan Skinner, and Steven Weinberg. What accounts for the
variation in retirement wealth among U.S. households? American Economic Review,
91(4):832{857, September 2001.
[13] Carol Bertaut and Martha Starr-McCluer. Household portfolios in the United States.
In Guiso et al. [44], pages 181{217.
[14] Truman F. Bewley. The permanent income hypothesis: A theoretical formulation.
Journal of Economic Theory, 16(2):252{292, December 1977.
[15] Martin Browning, Lars Peter Hansen, and James Heckman. Micro data and general
equilibrium models. In John Taylor and Michael Woodford, editors, Handbook of
Macroeconomics, volume 1A, pages 543{633. Elsevier, 1999.
[16] Martin Browning and Annamaria Lusardi. Household saving: Micro theories and
micro facts. Journal of Economic Literature, 24:1797{1855, December 1996.
40[17] Francisco Buera. A dynamic model of entrepreneurship with borrowing constraints.
Mimeo, 2004.
[18] Marco Cagetti. Interest elasticity in a life-cycle model with precautionary savings.
American Economic Review, 91(2):418{421, May 2001.
[19] Marco Cagetti. Wealth accumulation over the life cycle and precautionary savings.
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 21(3):339{353, July 2003.
[20] Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi. Entrepreneurship, frictions, and wealth.
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Sta® Report 322, September 2003.
[21] Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi. Taxation, entrepreneurship and wealth.
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Sta® Report 340, July 2004.
[22] John Cambell, Joao Cocco, Francisco Gomez, and Pascal Maenhout. Investing retire-
ment wealth: A life cycle model. Mimeo, March 1999.
[23] John Y. Campbell and Luis Viceira. Strategic Asset Allocation. Oxford University
Press, New York, NY, 2002.
[24] Christopher D. Carroll. Bu®er stock saving and the life-cycle/permanent income hy-
pothesis. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(1):1{55, February 1997.
[25] Christopher D. Carroll. Why do the rich save so much? In Joel B. Slemrod, editor,
Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich, pages 466{484.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
[26] Christopher D. Carroll. Portfolios of the rich. In Guiso et al. [44], pages 389{430.
[27] Ana Casta~ neda, Javier D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez, and Jos¶ e-Victor R¶ ³os-Rull. Accounting for the
U.S. earnings and wealth inequality. Journal of Political Economy, 111(4):818{857,
August 2003.
[28] Flavio Cunha, James J. Heckman, and Salvador Navarro-Lozano. Separating het-
erogeneity from life-cycle earnings. Oxford Economic Papers, 57(2):191{261, April
2005.
[29] Richard T. Curtin, F. Thomas Juster, and James N. Morgan. Survey estimates of
wealth: An assessment of quality. In Lipsey and Tice [69], pages 473{548.
[30] James B. Davies. The relative impact of inheritance and other factors on economic
inequality. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97(3):471{498, 1982.
[31] James B. Davies and Anthony F. Shorrocks. The distribution of wealth. In A.B.
Atkinson and F. Bourguignon, editors, Handbook of Income Distribution, pages 605{
675. Elsevier, 2000.
[32] Mariacristina De Nardi. Wealth inequality and intergenerational links. Review of
Economic Studies, 71(3):743{768, July 2004.
[33] Antonia D¶ ³az, Josep Pijoan-Mas, and Jos¶ e-Victor R¶ ³os-Rull. Habit formation: Impli-
cations for the wealth distribution. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(6):1257{1291,
August 2002.
41[34] Javier D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez, Vincenzo Quadrini, and Jos¶ e-Victor R¶ ³os-Rull. Dimensions of
inequality: Facts on the U.S. distributions of earnings, income and wealth. Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 21(2):3{21, Spring 1997.
[35] Karen Dynan, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen Zeldes. Do the rich save more? Journal
of Political Economy, 112(2):397{444, April 2004.
[36] Ra®aele Miniaci e Guglielmo Weber. Econometric issues in the estimation of household
portfolio models. In Guiso et al. [44], pages 143{178.
[37] Martin Eichenbaum and Dan Peled. Capital accumulation and annuities in an adverse
selection economy. Journal of Political Economy, 95(2):334{354, April 1987.
[38] Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and Cori R. Uccello. The adequacy of household
saving. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (2):65{187, 1999.
[39] Marjorie Flavin and Takashi Yamashita. Owner-occupied housing and the composition
of the household portfolio. American Economic Review, 92(1):345{362, 2002.
[40] William G. Gale and John Karl Scholz. Intergenerational transfers and the accumu-
lation of wealth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(4):145{160, Fall 1994.
[41] William M. Gentry and R. Glenn Hubbard. Entrepreneurship and household savings.
Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy, 4(1), 2004. Article 1.
[42] Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence J. Kotliko®, James Sefton, and Martin Weale. Simulat-
ing the transmission of wealth inequality via bequests. Journal of Public Economics,
79(1):93{128, 2000.
[43] Christian Gollier. What does theory have to say about household portfolios? In Guiso
et al. [44], pages 27{54.
[44] Luigi Guiso, Michael Haliassos, and Tullio Jappelli, editors. Household Portfolios.
MIT Press, 2002.
[45] Michael Haliassos and Alexander Michaelides. Calibration and computation of house-
hold portfolio models. In Guiso et al. [44], pages 55{103.
[46] John Heaton and Deborah Lucas. Portfolio choice and asset prices: The importance
of entrepreneurial risk. Journal of Finance, 55(3):1163{1198, June 2000.
[47] James Heckman, Lance Lochner, and Cristopher Taber. Explaining rising wage in-
equality: Explorations with a dynamic general equilibrium model. Review of Economic
Dynamics, 1(1):1{58, 1998.
[48] Burkhard Heer. Wealth distribution and optimal inheritance taxation in life-cycle
economies with intergenerational transfers. Mimeo. University of Cologne, Germany,
1999.
[49] Lutz Hendricks. Accounting for patterns of wealth inequality. Mimeo. Iowa State
University, 2004.
42[50] Lutz Hendricks. How important is preference heterogeneity for wealth inequality?
Mimeo. Iowa State University, 2004.
[51] R. Glenn Hubbard, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes. Precautionary saving
and social insurance. Journal of Political Economy, 103(2):360{399, 1995.
[52] Mark Huggett. Wealth distribution in life-cycle economies. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 38(3):469{494, December 1996.
[53] Mark Huggett, Gustavo Ventura, and Amir Yaron. Human capital and earnings dis-
tribution dynamics. Mimeo, 2003.
[54] Michael D. Hurd. Mortality risk and bequests. Econometrica, 57(4):779{813, July
1989.
[55] Michael D. Hurd. Portfolios of the elderly. In Guiso et al. [44], pages 431{472.
[56] Erik Hurst, Ming Ching Luoh, and Frank P. Sta®ord. Wealth dynamics of American
families, 1984-94. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (1):267{337, 1998.
[57] Hyeok Jeong and Robert M. Townsend. Sources of TFP growth: Occupational choice
and ¯nancial deepening. IEPR Working Paper Series, 2005.
[58] Arthur B. Kennickell. A rolling tide: Changes in the distribution of wealth in the
U.S., 1989-2001. Mimeo, September 2003.
[59] Wojciech Kopczuk and Emmanuel Saez. Top wealth shares in the United States, 1916-
2000: Evidence from estate tax returns. National Tax Journal, 57(2):445{487, June
2004.
[60] Laurence J. Kotliko® and Lawrence H. Summers. The role of intergenerational trans-
fers in aggregate capital accumulation. Journal of Political Economy, 89(4):706{732,
August 1981.
[61] Per Krusell and Anthony Smith, Jr. Income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroe-
conomy. Journal of Political Economy, 106(5):867{896, October 1998.
[62] David I. Laibson, Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman. Self control and retirement
savings. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1(1):91{172, 1998.
[63] John Laitner. Random earnings di®erences, lifetime liquidity constraints, and altru-
istic intergenerational transfers. Journal of Economic Theory, 58(2):135{170, 1992.
[64] John Laitner. Secular changes in wealth inequality and inheritance. The Economic
Journal, 111(474):691{721, 2001.
[65] John Laitner and Thomas F. Juster. New evidence on altruism, a study of tiaa-cref
retirees. American Economic Review, 86(4):893{908, 1996.
[66] Emily Lawrance. Poverty and the rate of time preference: Evidence from panel data.
Journal of Political Economy, 99:54{77, 1991.
[67] Lee A. Lillard and Lynn A. Karoly. Income and wealth accumulation over the life-
cycle. Manuscript, RAND Corporation, 1997.
43[68] Peter H. Lindert. When did inequality rise in Britain and America? Journal of Income
Distribution, 9:11{25, 2000.
[69] Robert E. Lipsey and Helen Stone Tice, editors. The Measurement of Saving, Invest-
ment and Wealth, volume 52 of Studies in Income and Wealth. University of Chicago
Press, 1989.
[70] Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent. Recursive Macroeconomic Theory. MIT
Press, Boston, MA, 2000.
[71] Robert E. Lucas, Jr. On the size distribution of business ¯rms. The Bell Journal of
Economics, 9(2):508{523, 1978.
[72] Annamaria Lusardi. Explaining why so many households do not save. Mimeo, January
2000.
[73] Cesaire Meh. Entrepreneurship, wealth inequality, and taxation. Review of Economic
Dynamics, 2005. Forthcoming.
[74] Franco Modigliani and Richard Blumberg. Utility analysis and the consumption func-
tion: An interpretation of cross-sectional data. In Kenneth K. Kurihara, editor, Post-
Keynesian Economics, pages 388{436. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ,
1954.
[75] Shinichi Nishiyama. Bequests, inter vivos transfers, and wealth distribution. Review
of Economic Dynamics, 5(4):892{931, October 2002.
[76] Anna L. Paulson and Robert Townsend. Entrepreneurship and ¯nancial constraints
in thailand. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10:229{262, 2004.
[77] Thomas Piketty, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean Laurent Rosenthal. Wealth concentra-
tion in a developing economy. Mimeo, 2005.
[78] Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez. Income inequality in the United States, 1913-
1998. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1):1{39, 2003.
[79] James M. Poterba. Taxation and portfolio structure: Issues and implications. In
Guiso et al. [44], pages 103{142.
[80] James M. Poterba and Andrew A. Samwick. Household portfolio allocation over the
life-cycle. NBER Working Paper 6185, 1997.
[81] Vincenzo Quadrini. The importance of entrepreneurship for wealth concentration and
mobility. Review of Income and Wealth, 45(1):1{19, March 1999.
[82] Vincenzo Quadrini. Entrepreneurship, saving, and social mobility. Review of Economic
Dynamics, 3(1):1{40, January 2000.
[83] Vincenzo Quadrini and Jos¶ e-Victor R¶ ³os-Rull. Models of the distribution of wealth.
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 21(2):1{21, Spring 1997.
[84] Santiago Budria Rodriguez, Javier D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez, Vincenzo Quadrini, and Jos¶ e-Victor
R¶ ³os-Rull. Updated facts on the U.S. distributions of earnings, income, and wealth.
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 26(3):2{35, Summer 2002.
44[85] Emmanuel Saez. Income and wealth concentration in a historical and international
perspective. In John Quigley, editor, Poverty, the Distribution of Income, and Public
Policy. Forthcoming.
[86] John Karl Scholz. Wealth inequality and the wealth of cohorts. mimeo, May 2003.
[87] John Karl Scholz, Ananth Seshadri, and Surachai Khitatrakun. Are Americans saving
optimally for retirement? NBER working paper 10260, January 2004.
[88] James P. Smith. Racial and ethnic di®erences in wealth in the health and retirement
study. Journal of Human Resources, 30:S158{S183, 1995. Supplement.
[89] Lee Soltow. Wealth inequality in the United States in 1798 and 1860. Review of
Economic and Statistics, 66:444{451, 1984.
[90] Kjetil Storesletten, Chris Telmer, and Amir Yaron. Asset pricing with idiosyncratic
risk and overlapping generations. Mimeo, June 1999.
[91] Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise. The cause of wealth dispersion at retirement:
Choice or chance? American Economic Review, 88(2):185{191, May 1988.
[92] Kirk White. Initial conditions at emancipation: the long run e®ect on black-white
wealth and income inequality. Mimeo, September 2003.
[93] Edward N. Wol®. Estimates of wealth inequality in the U.S., 1962-1983. Review of
Income and Wealth, 33:231{256, 1987.
[94] Edward N. Wol®. Changing inequality of wealth. American Economic Review,
82(2):552{558, may 1992.
[95] Edward N. Wol®. International comparisons in wealth inequality. Review of Income
and Wealth, 42:433{451, 1996.
[96] Edward N. Wol®. Recent trends in the size distribution of household wealth. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 12(3):131{150, Summer 1998.
[97] Edward N. Wol® and Marcia Marley. Long term trends in U.S. wealth inequality:
Methodological issues and results. In Lipsey and Tice [69], pages 765{844.
[98] Michael Wolfson. The causes of inequality in the distribution of wealth: A simulation
analysis. Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge University, 1977.
[99] Fang Yang. Accounting for heterogeneity in retirement wealth. Mimeo, University of
Minnesota, 2005.
[100] Fang Yang. Consumption along the life-cycle: How di®erent is housing. Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Working Paper 635, May 2005.
[101] Fang Yang. How do household portfolios vary with age? Mimeo, University of
Minnesota, 2005.
[102] Rui Yao and Harold H. Zhang. Optimal consumption and portfolio choices with risky
housing and borrowing constraints. Review of Financial Studies, 2004. Forthcoming.
451 
Working Paper Series 
 
A series of research studies on regional economic issues relating to the Seventh Federal 
Reserve District, and on financial and economic topics. 
 
Outsourcing Business Services and the Role of Central Administrative Offices   WP-02-01 
Yukako Ono 
 
Strategic Responses to Regulatory Threat in the Credit Card Market* WP-02-02 
Victor Stango 
 
The Optimal Mix of Taxes on Money, Consumption and Income  WP-02-03 
Fiorella De Fiore and Pedro Teles 
 
Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy  WP-02-04 
Stefania Albanesi, V. V. Chari and Lawrence J. Christiano 
 
Monetary Policy in a Financial Crisis  WP-02-05 
Lawrence J. Christiano, Christopher Gust and Jorge Roldos 
 
Regulatory Incentives and Consolidation: The Case of Commercial Bank Mergers 
and the Community Reinvestment Act  WP-02-06 
Raphael Bostic, Hamid Mehran, Anna Paulson and Marc Saidenberg 
 
Technological Progress and the Geographic Expansion of the Banking Industry  WP-02-07 
Allen N. Berger and Robert DeYoung 
 
Choosing the Right Parents:  Changes in the Intergenerational Transmission   WP-02-08 
of Inequality  Between 1980 and the Early 1990s 
David I. Levine and Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
The Immediacy Implications of Exchange Organization  WP-02-09 
James T. Moser 
 
Maternal Employment and Overweight Children   WP-02-10 
Patricia M. Anderson, Kristin F. Butcher and Phillip B. Levine 
 
The Costs and Benefits of Moral Suasion:  Evidence from the Rescue of   WP-02-11 
Long-Term Capital Management 
Craig Furfine 
 
On the Cyclical Behavior of Employment, Unemployment and Labor Force Participation  WP-02-12 
Marcelo Veracierto 
 
Do Safeguard Tariffs and Antidumping Duties Open or Close Technology Gaps?  WP-02-13 
Meredith A. Crowley 
 
Technology Shocks Matter  WP-02-14 
Jonas D. M. Fisher 
 
Money as a Mechanism in a Bewley Economy  WP-02-15 
Edward J. Green and Ruilin Zhou 
 2 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy:  Equivalence Results  WP-02-16 
Isabel Correia, Juan Pablo Nicolini and Pedro Teles 
 
Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations and the Dynamics of Retail Trade Industries  WP-02-17 
on the U.S.-Canada Border 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Beverly Lapham 
 
Bank Procyclicality, Credit Crunches, and Asymmetric Monetary Policy Effects:    WP-02-18 
A Unifying Model 
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman 
 
Location of Headquarter Growth During the 90s  WP-02-19 
Thomas H. Klier 
 
The Value of Banking Relationships During a Financial Crisis:   WP-02-20 
Evidence from Failures of Japanese Banks 
Elijah Brewer III, Hesna Genay, William Curt Hunter and George G. Kaufman 
 
On the Distribution and Dynamics of Health Costs WP-02-21 
Eric French and John Bailey Jones 
 
The Effects of Progressive Taxation on Labor Supply when Hours and Wages are   WP-02-22 
Jointly Determined   
Daniel Aaronson and Eric French 
 
Inter-industry Contagion and the Competitive Effects of Financial Distress Announcements:   WP-02-23 
Evidence from Commercial Banks and Life Insurance Companies   
Elijah Brewer III and William E. Jackson III 
 
State-Contingent Bank Regulation With Unobserved Action and  WP-02-24 
Unobserved Characteristics 
David A. Marshall and Edward Simpson Prescott 
 
Local Market Consolidation and Bank Productive Efficiency  WP-02-25 
Douglas D. Evanoff and Evren Örs 
 
Life-Cycle Dynamics in Industrial Sectors. The Role of Banking Market Structure  WP-02-26 
Nicola Cetorelli 
 
Private School Location and Neighborhood Characteristics  WP-02-27 
Lisa Barrow 
 
Teachers and Student Achievement in the Chicago Public High Schools  WP-02-28 
Daniel Aaronson, Lisa Barrow and William Sander 
 
The Crime of 1873: Back to the Scene  WP-02-29 
François R. Velde 
 
Trade Structure, Industrial Structure, and International Business Cycles  WP-02-30 
Marianne Baxter and Michael A. Kouparitsas 
 
Estimating the Returns to Community College Schooling for Displaced Workers  WP-02-31 
Louis Jacobson, Robert LaLonde and Daniel G. Sullivan 3 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
A Proposal for Efficiently Resolving Out-of-the-Money Swap Positions   WP-03-01 
at Large Insolvent Banks 
George G. Kaufman 
 
Depositor Liquidity and Loss-Sharing in Bank Failure Resolutions  WP-03-02 
George G. Kaufman 
 
Subordinated Debt and Prompt Corrective Regulatory Action  WP-03-03 
Douglas D. Evanoff and Larry D. Wall 
 
When is Inter-Transaction Time Informative?  WP-03-04 
Craig Furfine 
 
Tenure Choice with Location Selection: The Case of Hispanic Neighborhoods  WP-03-05 
in Chicago  
Maude Toussaint-Comeau and Sherrie L.W. Rhine 
 
Distinguishing Limited Commitment from Moral Hazard in Models of  WP-03-06 
Growth with Inequality* 
Anna L. Paulson and Robert Townsend 
 
Resolving Large Complex Financial Organizations  WP-03-07 
Robert R. Bliss 
 
The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth:  WP-03-08 
Or, Does information technology explain why productivity accelerated in the United States 
but not the United Kingdom? 
Susanto Basu, John G. Fernald, Nicholas Oulton and Sylaja Srinivasan 
 
Inside-Outside Money Competition  WP-03-09 
Ramon Marimon, Juan Pablo Nicolini and Pedro Teles 
 
The Importance of Check-Cashing Businesses to the Unbanked: Racial/Ethnic Differences  WP-03-10 
William H. Greene, Sherrie L.W. Rhine and Maude Toussaint-Comeau 
 
A Firm’s First Year  WP-03-11 
Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell 
 
Market Size Matters  WP-03-12 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Hugo A. Hopenhayn 
 
The Cost of Business Cycles under Endogenous Growth  WP-03-13 
Gadi Barlevy 
 
The Past, Present, and Probable Future for Community Banks  WP-03-14 
Robert DeYoung, William C. Hunter and Gregory F. Udell 
 
Measuring Productivity Growth in Asia: Do Market Imperfections Matter?  WP-03-15 
John Fernald and Brent Neiman 
 
Revised Estimates of Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States  WP-03-16 
Bhashkar Mazumder 4 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Product Market Evidence on the Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage  WP-03-17 
Daniel Aaronson and Eric French 
 
Estimating Models of On-the-Job Search using Record Statistics  WP-03-18 
Gadi Barlevy 
 
Banking Market Conditions and Deposit Interest Rates   WP-03-19 
Richard J. Rosen 
 
Creating a National State Rainy Day Fund: A Modest Proposal to Improve Future   WP-03-20 
State Fiscal Performance  
Richard Mattoon 
 
Managerial Incentive and Financial Contagion   WP-03-21 
Sujit Chakravorti, Anna Llyina and Subir Lall 
 
Women and the Phillips Curve: Do Women’s and Men’s Labor Market Outcomes   WP-03-22 
Differentially Affect Real Wage Growth and Inflation? 
Katharine Anderson, Lisa Barrow and Kristin F. Butcher 
 
Evaluating the Calvo Model of Sticky Prices  WP-03-23 
Martin Eichenbaum and Jonas D.M. Fisher 
 
The Growing Importance of Family and Community: An Analysis of Changes in the  WP-03-24 
Sibling Correlation in Earnings 
Bhashkar Mazumder and David I. Levine 
 
Should We Teach Old Dogs New Tricks? The Impact of Community College Retraining  WP-03-25 
on Older Displaced Workers 
Louis Jacobson, Robert J. LaLonde and Daniel Sullivan 
 
Trade Deflection and Trade Depression   WP-03-26 
Chad P. Brown and Meredith A. Crowley 
 
China and Emerging Asia: Comrades or Competitors?   WP-03-27 
Alan G. Ahearne, John G. Fernald, Prakash Loungani and John W. Schindler 
 
International Business Cycles Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes   WP-03-28 
Michael A. Kouparitsas 
 
Firing Costs and Business Cycle Fluctuations   WP-03-29 
Marcelo Veracierto 
 
Spatial Organization of Firms   WP-03-30 
Yukako Ono 
 
Government Equity and Money: John Law’s System in 1720 France   WP-03-31 
François R. Velde 
 
Deregulation and the Relationship Between Bank CEO   WP-03-32 
Compensation and Risk-Taking 
Elijah Brewer III, William Curt Hunter and William E. Jackson III 
 5 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Compatibility and Pricing with Indirect Network Effects: Evidence from ATMs   WP-03-33 
Christopher R. Knittel and Victor Stango 
 
Self-Employment as an Alternative to Unemployment   WP-03-34 
Ellen R. Rissman 
 
Where the Headquarters are – Evidence from Large Public Companies 1990-2000   WP-03-35 
Tyler Diacon and Thomas H. Klier 
 
Standing Facilities and Interbank Borrowing: Evidence from the Federal Reserve’s   WP-04-01 
New Discount Window  
Craig Furfine 
 
Netting, Financial Contracts, and Banks: The Economic Implications   WP-04-02 
William J. Bergman, Robert R. Bliss, Christian A. Johnson and George G. Kaufman 
 
Real Effects of Bank Competition   WP-04-03 
Nicola Cetorelli 
 
Finance as a Barrier To Entry: Bank Competition and Industry Structure in   WP-04-04 
Local U.S. Markets? 
Nicola Cetorelli and Philip E. Strahan 
 
The Dynamics of Work and Debt   WP-04-05 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz 
 
Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of 9/11   WP-04-06 
Jonas Fisher and Martin Eichenbaum 
 
Merger Momentum and Investor Sentiment: The Stock Market Reaction 
To Merger Announcements   WP-04-07 
Richard J. Rosen 
 
Earnings Inequality and the Business Cycle   WP-04-08 
Gadi Barlevy and Daniel Tsiddon 
 
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets:  The Case of Payment Networks  WP-04-09 
Sujit Chakravorti and Roberto Roson 
 
Nominal Debt as a Burden on Monetary Policy   WP-04-10 
Javier Díaz-Giménez, Giorgia Giovannetti, Ramon Marimon, and Pedro Teles 
 
On the Timing of Innovation in Stochastic Schumpeterian Growth Models   WP-04-11 
Gadi Barlevy 
 
Policy Externalities: How US Antidumping Affects Japanese Exports to the EU WP-04-12 
Chad P. Bown and Meredith A. Crowley 
 
Sibling Similarities, Differences and Economic Inequality WP-04-13 
Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
Determinants of Business Cycle Comovement: A Robust Analysis WP-04-14 
Marianne Baxter and Michael A. Kouparitsas 6 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
The Occupational Assimilation of Hispanics in the U.S.: Evidence from Panel Data WP-04-15 
Maude Toussaint-Comeau  
 
Reading, Writing, and Raisinets
1: Are School Finances Contributing to Children’s Obesity? WP-04-16 
Patricia M. Anderson and Kristin F. Butcher  
 
Learning by Observing: Information Spillovers in the Execution and Valuation WP-04-17 
of Commercial Bank M&As 
Gayle DeLong and Robert DeYoung 
 
Prospects for Immigrant-Native Wealth Assimilation:  WP-04-18 
Evidence from Financial Market Participation 
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson 
 
Individuals and Institutions:  Evidence from International Migrants in the U.S.  WP-04-19 
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson 
 
Are Technology Improvements Contractionary?  WP-04-20 
Susanto Basu, John Fernald and Miles Kimball 
 
The Minimum Wage, Restaurant Prices and Labor Market Structure  WP-04-21 
Daniel Aaronson, Eric French and James MacDonald 
 
Betcha can’t acquire just one: merger programs and compensation  WP-04-22 
Richard J. Rosen 
 
Not Working: Demographic Changes, Policy Changes,  WP-04-23 
and the Distribution of Weeks (Not) Worked 
Lisa Barrow and Kristin F. Butcher 
 
The Role of Collateralized Household Debt in Macroeconomic Stabilization  WP-04-24 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz 
 
Advertising and Pricing at Multiple-Output Firms: Evidence from U.S. Thrift Institutions  WP-04-25 
Robert DeYoung and Evren Örs 
 
Monetary Policy with State Contingent Interest Rates  WP-04-26 
Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia and Pedro Teles 
 
Comparing location decisions of domestic and foreign auto supplier plants  WP-04-27 
Thomas Klier, Paul Ma and Daniel P. McMillen 
 
China’s export growth and US trade policy  WP-04-28 
Chad P. Bown and Meredith A. Crowley 
 
Where do manufacturing firms locate their Headquarters?  WP-04-29 
J. Vernon Henderson and Yukako Ono 
 
Monetary Policy with Single Instrument Feedback Rules  WP-04-30 
Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia and Pedro Teles 7 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Firm-Specific Capital, Nominal Rigidities and the Business Cycle  WP-05-01 
David Altig, Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum and Jesper Linde 
 
Do Returns to Schooling Differ by Race and Ethnicity?  WP-05-02 
Lisa Barrow and Cecilia Elena Rouse 
 
Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout  WP-05-03 
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman 
 
Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio Decisions  WP-05-04 
Robert DeYoung, Anne Gron and Andrew Winton 
 
Characterizations in a random record model with a non-identically distributed initial record  WP-05-05 
Gadi Barlevy and H. N. Nagaraja 
 
Price discovery in a market under stress: the U.S. Treasury market in fall 1998  WP-05-06 
Craig H. Furfine and Eli M. Remolona 
 
Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets  WP-05-07 
Marco Bassetto with Thomas J. Sargent 
 
Rigid Prices: Evidence from U.S. Scanner Data  WP-05-08 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Benjamin Eden 
 
Entrepreneurship, Frictions, and Wealth  WP-05-09 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
Wealth inequality: data and models  WP-05-10 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 